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The self is relied on disproportionately as a source of information about the social 
world. Recent research has found that people’s implicit personality theories—beliefs 
about how personality traits tend to relate in other people—are rooted in perceptions of 
the self. That is, people engage in egocentric pattern projection: they expect traits to be 
patterned in other people in the same way that they are patterned in the self. Five studies 
test why pattern projection emerges and why it is egocentric.  It is proposed that 
individuals look to their own personalities and develop causal theories to explain why 
personality traits relate as they do in the self. These causal trait narratives then guide the 
causal theories that people use to explain why personality traits correlate more generally, 
their implicit personality theories. This account makes three predictions that the present 
studies test and support. First, this suggests that implicit personality theories are not 
represented merely as assumed correlations, but that causal theories (i.e., Trait A 
influences Trait B) underlie these assumed relationships. Consistent with this possibility, 
Study 1 found that implicit personality theories are directional—Trait A implies standing 
on Trait B differently than Trait B implies standing on Trait A. Second, this account 
predicts that people will be most likely to pattern project a given trait relationship once 
they have developed a causal theory for the patterning in the self (Study 2). If causal trait 
narratives do indeed underlie pattern projection, then pattern projection may be egocentric  
because people have more comprehensive causal trait narratives to explain the self than to 
explain other people. People indeed reported having more causal theories in their causal 
trait narratives of themselves than of someone else (Studies 3 and 4), and such causal trait 
self-narratives were more accessible (Study 4). But when participants were asked to 
generate a causal trait narrative to explain a novel social target, their implicit personality 
theories assimilated toward the patternings observed in the target. (Study 5) This confirms 
a theoretically-derived limit on pattern projection’s egocentrism and supports a key causal 
claim: causal trait narratives influence implicit personality theories. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A person’s perspective on his or her social world is fundamentally self-centered. 
Whether in trying to take another’s perspective, trying to predict the opinions of others, or 
trying to evaluate another person, the self’s own perspective, characteristics, and standing 
influence such judgments.  Such self-centeredness, or egocentrism, leads people to 
inadvertently activate the self when making judgments about others (Dunning & Hayes, 
1996). People define traits in self-serving ways when making judgments of others 
(Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). They use egocentric standards in evaluating 
the quality of others’ performance (Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & Hayes, 1996) 
and take an egocentric perspective when considering the viewpoint of others (Epley, 
Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004).  
Most demonstrations of the egocentric nature of social judgment can be accounted 
for by one of two explanations. First, the self is a readily accessible exemplar, and thus an 
egocentric viewpoint serves as a natural anchor when thinking about the social world. It is 
effortful to adjust from this egocentric perspective, leaving many social perspectives too 
egocentrically bound. Second, the self may take an egocentric perspective in judging 
others in order to manage its own motivational needs. For example, college professors 
who achieve tenure then adopt more stringent criteria for what constitutes high 
productivity (Eidelman & Biernat, 2007). By egocentrically using one’s own levels of 
achievement to define success, one can make sure that the self is always viewed in the 
most flattering light as possible. 
One of the most well-documented influences of the self on social judgment, 
attributive projection, can be accounted for by both of these mechanisms. People assume 
that others hold the same traits, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies as does the self—an 
assumption that has been shown to predict whether or not people see others as honest 
(Katz & Allport, 1931), happy (Goldings, 1954), sharing their political views (Judd,   2 
Kenny, & Krosnick, 1983), willing to wear an “Eat at Joe’s” sandwich board around 
campus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), and characterized by many different personality 
traits (Holmes, 1981; Krueger & Stanke, 2001). People will project because the self is a 
readily accessible guide that may offer reasonable insight as to what others think (Dawes, 
1990; Dawes & Mulford, 1996). Also, projection provides a motivationally satisfying 
sense of social consensus and validation for one’s own beliefs, leading people to believe 
that even God—perhaps the ultimate arbiter of truth—endorses one’s own belief system 
(Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo 2009).  
But these accounts do not provide a good explanation for a recently identified 
phenomenon by which self-views impact social judgment: egocentric pattern projection 
(Critcher & Dunning, 2009a). Although egocentric pattern projection is a projection 
phenomenon—people expect to see features of the self in other people—it is qualitatively 
distinct from all previously documented projection phenomena. Prior demonstrations of 
projection reflected variations on a single theme: An attribute is observed in the self, and 
people expect to or do see that same attribute in other people. In contrast, pattern 
projection emerges when people observe two attributes in the self, infer a correlation 
between the attributes based on the way they are patterned in the self, and then expect to 
see the same correlation in other people. For example, if Jens sees himself as egalitarian 
and emotional, attributive projection predicts that Jens expects others to be more 
egalitarian and more emotional than do cold, inegalitarian types. Pattern projection 
predicts Jens expects egalitarian people to be emotional and prejudicial people to be less 
so. That is, Jens expects that the patterning of traits in others will recapitulate the 
patterning of traits in the self. In analysis of variance terms, attributive projection predicts 
two main effects in social judgment, whereas pattern projection predicts an interaction.  
Critcher and Dunning’s (2009a) demonstration of pattern projection challenged a 
conclusion that had lain dormant in social psychology for more than three decades—that   3 
there were no systematically detectable individual differences in people’s implicit 
personality theories (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979). In making inferences about 
others’ personalities, people lean on implicit personality theories—beliefs about how 
personality traits tend to be configured in people in general (Bruner & Taiguri, 1954). Past 
research had found that such theories reflected culturally shared beliefs (Wishner, 1960) 
that were guided in large part by judgments of the degree of semantic overlap between 
traits (D’Anrade, 1974). These influences would be expected to produce a fair degree of 
consensus in people’s theories. Egocentric pattern projection identifies one reason why 
there exists variation in people’s theories. Individual differences in how traits relate in the 
self predict individual differences in people’s implicit personality theories for such traits 
(Critcher & Dunning, 2009a). 
Critcher and Dunning (2009a) demonstrated that people’s implicit personality 
theories show evidence of pattern projection, that such pattern projection is egocentric 
(influenced by the way traits are patterned in the self, but not the way traits are patterned 
in a well-known other), and that the self plays a causal role in bringing about implicit 
personality theories. In Study 1, participants rated themselves and their freshman year 
roommates on a number of personality traits, and provided estimates of certain population 
parameters from which implicit personality theories could be inferred. People pattern 
projected from themselves, but not from their roommates. That is, beliefs about how 
personality traits were correlated recapitulated patternings in the self, but not those 
observed in a roommate. Studies 2 and 3 showed that these egocentric implicit personality 
theories actually guided people’s initial impressions of novel targets and helped organize 
people’s impressions of well-known others. In Studies 4 and 5, Critcher and Dunning 
(2009a) provided fictitious feedback to participants about their standing on two fictitious 
personality dimensions: front/back-brainedness and V/Z-dominance. Participants shifted 
their implicit personality theories to reflect that they assumed the two novel dimensions   4 
were correlated in a way that would produce the patterning observed in the self. For 
example, individuals who were both V-dominant and front-brained believed that front-
brained individuals were more likely to be V-dominant, and that back-brained individuals 
were more likely to be Z-dominant. No similar shift occurred when participants learned 
another participant’s test feedback. Although Critcher and Dunning (2009a) focused on 
the what of the pattern projection phenomenon, they did not focus on the why of it. The 
present research sought to answer both why pattern projection emerges and why it is 
egocentric.   
An Explanation of Egocentric Pattern Projection 
Why would pattern projection emerge, and why might it be egocentric in origin? I 
hypothesize that pattern projection emerges as a byproduct of trying to understand the 
self. I suggest that over time people engage in self-reflection that attempts to create a 
causally coherent narrative explaining why traits relate as they do in the self. For example, 
creative extroverts may come to decide that exposure to others gives them new ideas and 
experiences that fuel their creativity, whereas creative introverts may come to believe that 
time away from others allows them time for solitary reflection that aids in their creative 
pursuits.  Note that both of these causal relationships may be true, but pattern projection 
emerges when people start to apply these person-specific theories to understand people in 
general. To the extent that people tend to generate such causal narratives to explain the 
self more than they do to explain other people, egocentric pattern projection may emerge. 
I propose that egocentric pattern projection can be understood to emerge from the 
convergence of three principles or phenomena. First, and consistent with the account 
sketched above, I propose that implicit personality theories are not represented merely as 
correlations, but actually reflect causal theories. That is, people do not merely assume that 
creativity and extroversion are correlated, but people believe traits are associated because 
people have a theory for why one trait causes the other. Second, I propose that such   5 
theories are not first developed to explain patternings observed in the world, but are first 
developed to explain patternings in a sample of one (e.g., the self). This reflects a 
heretofore unidentified type of person representation, what I call a causal trait narrative. 
Causal trait narratives go beyond piecemeal trait judgments and reflect causal theories that 
explain why traits are patterned in a person. Such narratives, first used to explain a single 
person, provide the foundation for people’s more general implicit personality theories. 
The exportation of these theories is pattern projection. Third, if this account of pattern 
projection is true, then the phenomenon would be egocentric because people have more 
comprehensive (and accessible) narratives to explain the self than someone else. This of 
course suggests a possible limit to pattern projection’s egocentrism. When people develop 
a comprehensive causal trait narrative about a peer, then people should begin to non-
egocentrically pattern projection from that peer. This account is consistent with, makes 
novel connections between, and extends on theorizing about perceived correlations, 
inductive reasoning, implicit personality theories, narrative conceptions of the self, and 
asymmetries in representations of the self and others. I will proceed to outline previous 
research that supports the tenability of my explanation of egocentric pattern projection. 
Premise 1: Causal Theories Underlie Assumed Correlations (IPTs) 
First, our explanation relies on cognitive psychology findings that perceived 
correlations are not represented as matrices of assumed correlation coefficients, but as 
explanatory theories (Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990; 
McNorgan, Kotack, Meehan, & McRae, 2007; Murphy & Wisniewsky, 1989). Illustrating 
the crucial role of causal theories in correlation detection, Ahn, Marsh, Luhman, and Lee 
(2002) tried to account for past findings showing that people are much better at detecting 
certain real-world correlations than they are others (Malt & Smith, 1984). For example, 
most people recognize that among birds, there is a relationship between a tendency to live 
close to the ocean and to have fish be part of the bird’s diet. In contrast, people are less   6 
likely to notice that among shirts, there is a correlation between a shirt having buttons on 
it and its being long-sleeved.  The former correlation is more intuitive because people can 
generate a causal narrative to explain it (e.g., “If a bird wants to eat fish, it behooves it to 
live hear the ocean.”) In contrast, people are less likely to have an explanatory narrative 
that can account for the correlation between buttons and sleeves among shirts.  
As Ahn et al. (2002) explicitly noted, their correlational study left open the 
question of whether “people explicitly notice correlations because they can explain them, 
or [whether] people impose explanations after they explicitly notice correlations” (p. 115). 
Note that my explanation of egocentric pattern projection is essentially a mix of these two 
ideas. I suggest that people first notice a “correlation” in a sample of one (i.e., the self). 
They then generate a theory to explain that patterning, and this theory serves as the 
foundation for the expectation of this patterning in others. 
Several, independent programs of research suggest that people may readily 
generalize the theories they have developed about a single exemplar (e.g., the self) to 
understand all members of a category (e.g., people in general). Examining instances of 
inductive reasoning, Lassaline (1996) found that people induced general relations from 
observed feature co-occurrences to the extent that the features were bound by perceived 
causal relations as opposed to when they were merely temporally contiguous. Showing a 
similar effect in a more social domain, Risen, Gilovich, and Dunning (2007) found that 
once participants generated explanations for why a specific minority group member 
exhibited certain behaviors, people readily generalized this new social knowledge to new 
minority group exemplars. Both examples show that theories developed to explain single 
examples can readily be extended to describe members of a more general category. Of 
course, when Risen et al. (2007) presented participants with odd behaviors (e.g., sleeping 
in a tent in one’s bedroom) by members of unusual groups (e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses), 
then the theories participants would create (e.g., I guess one of the tenants of their religion   7 
is this unusual sleeping practice) should quite reasonably be extended to new group 
exemplars. Thus, although there is certainly precedent for the generalization of causal 
theories, it remained less certain whether I would observe that a theory connecting two 
non-central personality traits would prompt similar generalization. 
Although there is clearly precedent for causal theories to underlie perceived 
correlations, a key question in the present research is whether such causal theories 
underlie the specific class of correlations that make up implicit personality theories. 
Historically, there have been 3 conceptions of the structure of implicit personality 
theories. First, according to an associationistic view, IPTs reflect assumed correlations. As 
Anderson and Sedikides (1991) explained, an associationistic IPT would assume that 
“Trait A [would] describe a person who has Traits B, C, and D to the extent that A is 
assumed to correlate positively with B, C, and D” (p. 203). From this perspective, IPTs 
are represented as (some version of) a Pearson product-moment correlation. Second, the 
dimensional view is analogous, except it assumes that people are located on different 
factors or dimensions in a multi-dimensional trait space (Kim & Rosenberg, 1980; 
Rosenberg, 1976). Because traits that load on the same factor can be assumed to be 
correlated, the dimensional view differs from the associationistic view in more neatly 
delineating traits that are intercorrelated (i.e., those that load on the same factor) from 
those that are uncorrelated (i.e., those on different factors). Third, Anderson and Sedikides 
(1991) provide support that implicit personality theories may also be typological. From 
this perspective, different traits cluster into “person types.” These trait clusters guide 
social perception above and beyond the assumed correlations between or dimensional 
structure of traits. 
I am proposing a fourth possibility, that implicit personality theories are just that—
theories. They are not merely Pearson correlation coefficients, factor loadings, or traits 
clusters. And in fact, Sedikides and Anderson (1994) presaged this perspective by arguing   8 
that causal theories are what underlie the person types they had earlier identified 
(Anderson & Sedikdies, 1991). Sedikides and Anderson (1994) found that traits within a 
cluster or a person type were seen to be more causally related than traits not in the same 
cluster. As the title of their paper clearly describes, causal theories may be “The Glue That 
Holds Person Types Together.” I propose that causal theories do not merely underlie 
people’s understanding of the trait clusters that underlie person types, but may underlie 
people’s thinking about trait relationships more generally. Thus, I do not doubt that people 
may hold particularly elaborated narratives or causal theories to account for certain person 
types, but I propose that such causal theories may account for people’s implicit 
personality theories more generally. 
Premise 2: Person Representations (Sometimes) Include Causal Trait Narratives  
I have argued that beliefs about trait correlations (IPTs) may be rooted in causal 
theories, and that if people have developed such theories to explain the self, these may 
color one’s IPTs. But this is premised on the possibility that person representations may 
include such explanatory causal theories—what I call causal trait narratives. Causal 
thinking is known to be pervasive in many domains of thought. Prior research has noted 
the central or organizing role of causal thought in people’s understanding of concepts and 
categories (Murphy & Medin, 1985), in people’s ability to comprehend stories (Black, 
Galambos, & Read, 1984; Hastie & Pennington, 1991), in attempts to understand social 
relationships and events (Miller & Read, 1991; Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989), and 
in constructing explanations to make sense of life experiences (Baumeister & Newman, 
1994). I am arguing that causal thinking may also be important to the way people think 
about how traits are configured in a person.  
People are especially curious about questions of causality in social domains. As 
Kunda, Miller, and Claire (1990) suggested, most people find it of little interest why 
inanimate objects have the features they do (e.g., color), but are fascinated with why   9 
people develop into the people they are. And at first glance, the person perception 
literature, with its historical emphasis on trait ascription (Anderson, 1981; Asch, 1946), 
might seem to have overlooked the type of causal thinking that may underlie person 
perception. Given that traits are the most commonly used descriptors used when 
describing others (Park, 1986), this apparent neglect may seem perfectly reasonable. But if 
one looks carefully at what social descriptions have been credited as trait-based, one sees 
that even trait-based descriptions are filled with causal logic. For example, one of Park’s 
(1986) participants provided the following description of another person: “She is wealthy 
and egotistical, which makes for great fashion sense and good looks.” If one merely coded 
such a sentence for the presentation of piecemeal facts, one would have overlooked the 
important causal structure that underlies this narrative [(Wealthy + Egotistical)   
(Fashionable + Attractive)]. Park (1986) was referring to traits when she said that, “The 
dominant category of social information appears to be that which is based on inferences as 
opposed to observed facts” (p. 911). I entirely agree, but suggest that such inferred 
conclusions do not stop with traits, but also include the causal structure that underlies our 
conception of traits and the relation between them. That is, people develop and possess 
causal trait narratives.  
Beyond this limited evidence that person conceptions include causal trait 
narratives, there is reason to believe that people should find causal trait narratives 
appealing, and perhaps even more appealing than a list of traits. In general, beliefs that 
can explain other notions are seen to be more valuable than beliefs that can be explained 
(Preston & Epley, 2005). This suggests that people find explanations that go to deeper 
levels of analysis (e.g., a causal explanatory trait narrative) more appealing than the 
features that such beliefs can explain (e.g., traits). And given that people have little 
difficulty generating ad hoc theories on demand (Mcnorgan, Kotack, Meegan, & McRae, 
2007), even about seemingly contradictory evidence (Asch & Zukier, 1984), people will   10 
likely be successful in generating comprehensive narratives that explain why a person 
(e.g., the self) is who he is. Given that causal trait narratives would seem to be 
epistemically satisfying, it is plausible to expect that people develop them. 
The idea that people do not think about people merely as lists of traits has been 
advanced most strongly by Daniel McAdams and his colleagues in their work on life 
narratives (McAdams, 1985, 2001). McAdams (1995) says trait descriptions offer “the 
psychology of the stranger” (p. 365). When we know someone better, we think of them in 
terms of their personal strivings, motivations, hopes, and values. At the most sophisticated 
level, people strive for a coherent narrative that expresses unity and purpose by stringing 
together the events of one’s past, present, and anticipated future. Such narratives move 
beyond mere lists of behavioral episodes (Adler & McAdams, 2007; Pals, 2006), in part 
by offering coherent, causal explanations that provide structure and order to a life story 
(Habermans & Bluck, 2000). 
I agree with McAdams’s point that our impressions of others are not mere lists of 
features about them, whether those are traits, strivings, or other intimate details that 
McAdams (1995) has called “personal concerns.” I believe that McAdams’ three levels of 
personality have skillfully laid out the raw materials that may go into conceptions of 
people. Also, I believe that what defines more sophisticated person representations is not 
merely the content of those representations (e.g., traits vs. behavioral episodes), but their 
structure as fractured or piecemeal as opposed to (causally) coherent and unified. In a 
sense, I propose that people have organizing narratives not only to make sense of their life 
episodes, but to make sense of the structure of their personality (i.e., their traits). These 
narratives offer a causally coherent structure that explain how different traits influence 
each other, providing a coherent explanation of how so many individual features can co-
occur and give rise to a person.     11 
Bruner’s (1990) distinction between paradigmatic and narrative thought is helpful 
in understanding the basic structure of a causal trait narrative.  Paradigmatic thought is 
characterized by logic and rational analysis, whereas narrative thought is characterized by 
storytelling. Causal trait narratives reflect a mix of these two types of thought. People 
have narrative explanations that have their foundation in logic. Thus, when Joe says that 
his competitive nature leads him to conscientiously pour over the rules and regulations of 
every contest he enters, he expresses the causal or paradigmatic thought “Competitive   
Conscientious” in a more content-rich, narrative form. I suggest that these causal 
narratives that are meant to characterize a single person (as argued below, typically, the 
self) become readily generalized to characterize people in general (e.g., Read & Cesa, 
1991). In short, the story we tell to understand one person becomes the story we use to 
understand people in general. 
Premise 3: Causal Trait Narratives Are Developed For The Self Especially 
  I have put forth two main ideas that, in combination, would produce pattern 
projection. If 1) implicit personality theories are causal theories and 2) people construct 
causal trait narratives to explain why traits relate in specific people, then it is quite 
possible that the theories people have to explain specific others may serve as a foundation 
for their understanding of more general trait correlations. This result is pattern projection. 
But one mystery would remain. Critcher and Dunning (2009a) found that pattern 
projection is egocentric. That is, the trait patternings perceived in the self better predicted 
participants’ implicit personality theories than did the trait patternings perceived in one’s 
roommate or in a fellow participant. According to the present account, this result would 
have emerged only if people are more likely to generate comprehensive causal trait 
narratives to understand the self as opposed to someone else. 
  Although much of the original research on self-other differences accounted for 
ways in which people explained the behavior of the self and others in different ways   12 
(Watson, 1982), more recent research has suggested there are basic representational 
differences in people’s conceptions of themselves versus other people. These differences 
lend plausibility to the possibility that people are more likely to generate causal trait 
narratives of the self than of someone else. First, people are more sensitive to the internal 
dynamics of the self compared to those of other people. The self is represented more in 
terms of internal, covert reactions, whereas others are understood in terms of their overt 
social behavior (McGuire & McGuire, 1986). We take a shallower “behavioral” 
perspective on others in part because we see others’ external behaviors as particularly 
informative. People think that by observing the behaviors of others over time, one will 
observe more diagnostic information about their “true selves” than would observers of 
one’s own behaviors (Anderson & Ross, 1984).   People believe that in understanding the 
self, external behavior does not provide the whole story (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). If 
people feel that descriptions based on external behaviors offer satisfying portraits of other 
people more so than for the self, they might be more inclined to search for deeper, causal 
theories to understand the self. 
  Although there is no direct evidence that people are especially likely to generate 
causal theories to make sense of the self, there is evidence that representations of others 
involve mere description, whereas representations of the self reflect more explanation and 
extrapolation. Prentice (1990) had participants describe the self and others in specific 
contexts. Participants were also instructed to write more general, decontextualized 
descriptions of the self and of the same other people. Participants’ situation-specific and 
decontextualized descriptions were similar when describing other people, but showed a 
divergence when describing the self. That is, our understandings of others involve 
averaging and aggregating of information in specific contexts. When considering the self, 
the whole is different than the sum of its parts. Given that causal trait narratives help   13 
transform individual pieces of information into more global, coherent impressions, it may 
be that people have engaged in more causal narration for the self than for other people. 
  Of course, it would be naïve to predict that people never engage in narrative 
construction about others, but I contend that such narratives may be narrower in scope and 
more simplistic in structure. A number of previous findings support this possibility. First, 
although people compose “person models” to explain other people, these models tend to 
be structured around a central trait, with additional information linked to this core concept 
(Park, DeKray, & Kraus, 1994). Even if causal theories provided the glue for such person 
models, there would be few traits pairs for such theories to explain. And even when 
representations of others include many traits, the simplistic structure of those person 
models suggests there are not elaborate causal trait narratives underlying them. Borkenau 
and Liebler (1994) found that the factor structure of trait ratings for the self was more 
complex than the structure of traits ratings for someone else. Beer and Watson (2008) 
reported that the Big 5 dimensions are less intercorrelated in self ratings than in peer 
ratings. The more simplistic structure of representations of other people suggests there is 
little need for casual trait narratives, as much information in such conceptions is 
redundant. For example, Hampson (1998) found that evaluative inconsistencies are 
particularly uncommon in representations of others, hinting that people’s understanding of 
others may reflect a simple evaluative structure (e.g., “She’s a jerk”) that does not 
necessitate a rich causal narrative structure. In total, self-knowledge may be more 
nuanced, comprehensive, and complex in structure. Causal trait narratives may provide 
the glue that unifies this disparate self-knowledge. 
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Chapter 2: The Studies 
  I propose that egocentric pattern projection emerges as a byproduct of frequent 
self-reflection that strives to create a causally coherent narrative about the self. These 
causal trait narratives created to explain the self  (or, at times, someone else) contain 
causal theories that explain why traits are linked in that person. If implicit personality 
theories—beliefs about how personality traits tend to be related in the population at 
large—have causal theories at their core, then theories developed to explain a single 
person may become the theories used to explain people in general. If people develop 
richer causal trait narratives for the self than for other people, this would explain why 
pattern projection is egocentric. 
  This perspective makes a number of predictions that the five studies presented 
here were designed to test. First, this suggests that implicit personality theories may 
not be represented in mental matrices of intertrait correlations, but as causal theories 
of one trait causing or influencing another (Study 1). Second, people will be more 
likely to pattern project from a given trait pair in the self when that trait pair is 
included in people’s causal trait narrative of the self (Study 2). That is, if people have 
developed a causal theory to account for the cooccurence of two traits in the self, then 
they should be likely to export that theory such that it is reflected in their implicit 
personality theories. Third, to explain why pattern projection has been found to be 
egocentric, people should have more elaborated causal theories to explain the self than 
to explain someone else (Studies 3 and 4). Fourth, unifying across the second and third 
predictions above, people should begin to pattern project from someone else once they 
generate a causal theory that accounts for why traits relate in that other person (Study 
5). This would establish that causal trait narratives causally impact implicit personality 
theories and simultaneously demonstrate that pattern projection is not inherently 
egocentric.   15 
Study 1 
  I begin by testing the nature of implicit personality theories. If it is the case 
that implicit personality theories reflect causal theories (of the form trait A influences 
trait B), and are not merely represented by correlations, dimensions, or trait clusters, 
then there should be a certain directionality to people’s theories (Ahn et al., 2002). 
That is, people may have distinct theories for how much trait A predicts trait B, as 
opposed to trait B predicting trait A. If an implicit personality theory simply reflects 
the assumed correlation between A and B (or A and B’s proximity in 
multidimensional “trait space”), then A should imply B in the same way that B implies 
A. For example, it feels more intuitive that a father’s height predicts his son’s height 
than the reverse because of the causal theory that underlies this correlation (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1980). Of course, logically, these two judgments should be identical (see 
Kunda & Nisbett, 1986).  I examined whether implicit personality theories have 
directionality in two ways.  
  First, I tested whether participants’ implicit personality theories differed 
depending on the direction in which they were assessed. Participants expressed their 
implicit personality theories about fifty-five trait pairs. Between participants, I varied 
the directionality of these measures. That is, half of participants answered what 
percentage of people who were above-average on trait A would also be above-average 
on trait B, whereas the other half made judgments of the opposite form, predicting 
what percentage of people who were above-average on trait B would also be above-
average on trait A. Although the hypothesis that IPTs have directionality does not 
necessitate that the mean of the two directional theories (a particular directional theory 
and its converse) differ at the group level, it does follow that if the two judgments   16 
differ there must be directionality to the theories.
1 
  Second, I went beyond this most direct test of whether directionality matters by 
looking at the role of directionality in how implicit personality theories are applied. A 
week before participants expressed their implicit personality, participants completed a 
supposedly unrelated web-based pretest. They judged 20 targets about whom they had 
limited information. For each target, participants learned one piece of trait-based 
information (i.e., that the target was characterized by a trait or that trait’s opposite) 
before estimating what the person was like on a second trait. I varied, for each target, 
which of 2 traits participants learned the target’s standing on. In this way, for each 
target, there was a match or a mismatch in the directionality of the IPT and the target 
judgment. That is, some participants judged a target on trait A after learning the 
target’s standing on trait B, whereas others learned the target’s standing on trait B 
before judging them on trait A. To assess whether implicit personality theories are 
actually directional theories (and do not merely reflect assumed correlations), I tested 
whether implicit personality theories better predicted trait judgments when they were 
of matching directionality. If implicit personality theories are merely represented as 
assumed correlations, then directionality should not matter. For example, imagine 
rating how happy-go-lucky someone is if all you know about him is that he is very 
wordy. If there is directionality to IPTs, then this judgment can be predicted better 
from the IPT p (happy-go-lucky | wordy) than from the IPT p(wordy | happy-go-
lucky). If IPTs merely reflection assumed correlations, both IPTs should be equally 
predictive of the target judgment. 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the importance of directionality may disprove that implicit 
personality theories are merely represented as correlations, but it would not 
necessarily establish that causal theories underlie IPTs. Instead, such a finding would 
provide evidence consistent with this possibility. The remaining studies provide more 
conclusive positive evidence that causal theories bridge person representation and 
IPTs (to produce pattern projection).   17 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred nineteen undergraduates at Cornell University participated in 
exchange for extra course credit. Participants were instructed to complete a Target 
Rating Task on a web-based pretest approximately a week before coming to the lab. 
Two hundred three of the 219 participants (93%) actually did so. All participants 
completed an Implicit Personality Theory measure in the lab. Participants completed 
one of two versions of each of these measures.  
Procedure 
  A week before coming to the lab for the main portion of the study, participants 
completed a web-based Target Rating Task. All participants were informed that they 
were taking part in the second half of the study. Supposedly, in the first part, all of the 
students on the floor of a campus residence hall had rated each other on a variety of 
traits. The second part of the experiment was said to concern whether the participants 
could form impressions of others based on minimal information.  
  I created the fictitious targets using eleven personality traits that had been used 
in previous pattern projection research (Critcher & Dunning, 2009a): bashful, 
considerate, dependent, happy-go-lucky, idealistic, persistent, prideful, reserved, 
resigned, skeptical, and wordy. Of the 55 total trait pairs for which implicit personality 
theories would be measured in the lab, I randomly selected 20 of these trait pairs in 
order to form social targets. For ten of the trait pairs, a target was said to very much 
have one of the traits. For the other ten trait pairs, a target was said to not have one of 
the traits. I clarified that not having the trait meant that the target was seen to be the 
opposite of the trait. Thus, if a target was not at all (the opposite of) bashful, then this 
was meant to communicate that the target was particularly outgoing. I created two 
versions of each target by varying which trait was the one participants received target   18 
information about, and which was the trait participants judged. For example, 
participants either learned that “Person A was described as not at all (the opposite of) 
WORDY” and had to estimate how skeptical Person A was, or they learned that the 
target was not at all skeptical and had to estimate how wordy Person A was.  
  Once in the lab, participants expressed their implicit personality theories for all 
55 possible trait pairs, which included the 20 trait pairs that corresponded to the 20 
targets participants had judged a week before. I used a simpler implicit personality 
theory measure than that used by Critcher and Dunning (2009a). Instead of having 
participants provide both conditional (e.g., p (skeptical | wordy)) and marginal (e.g., p 
(skeptical) and p (wordy)) probability judgments, I had participants answer a single 
question that combined both of these elements.  Participants indicated what percentage 
of people who were more [trait 1] than the average person were also more [trait 2] 
than the average person. This simplification parallels the measurement strategy from 
Critcher and Dunning (2009a), but the marginal probabilities are implicit in the 
question wording. That is, given that 50% of the population is “above-average” (a 
premise we also made explicit in the instructions to participants), participants made 
estimates about traits that were assumed to be had by 50% of the population. In this 
way, higher [lower] responses to the single conditional probability question reflected a 
higher [lower] perceived correlation between the traits. The exact question participants 
saw was, “If you know that someone is more [trait X] than the average person, how 
likely is it that they are also more [trait Y] than the average person?” Half of 
participants expressed the implicit personality theory in the reverse order, in which 
trait X and trait Y were switched.  
  The materials were carefully constructed such that half of the IPTs were 
assessed directionally to match the corresponding target judgment, whereas half of the 
IPTs were measured in the reverse direction. In this way, I could see if the   19 
directionality of the implicit personality theory mattered in predicting target 
judgments, or whether implicit personality theories are actually just represented as 
correlations (i.e., without direction). Directionality should be observed if causal 
theories underlie IPTs, but not if IPTs are merely represented as assumed correlations 
or as trait clusters (both of which are “directionless”). 
Results 
  First, I tested whether the implicit personality theories participants expressed 
varied depending on the direction of measurement. Participants completed one of two 
versions of the implicit personality theory measure. The measures differed only in the 
directionality of the theories assessed. I therefore submitted all 55 implicit personality 
theories to a one-way MANOVA to test whether the expressed theories differed 
between the two versions. Indicating that directionality did matter, there was a 
significant effect of the measure version (i.e., directionality), F(55, 163) = 3.09, p < 
.001. Thirteen of the 55 trait pairs differed at the p < .05 level. These theories, and the 
mean IPTs by directionality, are listed in Table 1. This analysis in itself suggests that 
implicit personality theories are directional and do not merely reflect assumed 
correlations, but these results do not confirm the stronger claim that implicit 
personality theories are actually applied in a directional manner. 
  Second, I tested whether the social judgments that participants had made a 
week in advance could be better predicted by implicit personality theories that were 
matching in directionality than by those whose directionality mismatched.  It is first 
necessary to define several factors that I included in a hierarchical linear model. First, 
for every trait pair, participants expressed an Implicit Personality Theory, a probability 
judgment from 0 to 100. Second, each target that participants judged was said to be 
high or low on (i.e., the opposite of) a trait, its Target Level. Evidence that people 
were leaning on their implicit personality theories in judging targets would come from    20 
an Implicit Personality Theory (IPT) X Target Level interaction. There should be a 
positive effect of IPTs in judging targets high on a trait, but a negative effect of IPTs 
in judging targets low on a trait. But the key prediction is that the application of these 
theories would depend on directionality. Of the 20 trait pairs for which participants   21 
provided both IPTs and Target Judgments, ten matched and ten mismatched. (The 
precise ten pairs that matched or mismatched varied between participants.) The third  
factor distinguished between IPTs measured in a direction that matched versus 
mismatched the direction in which the target judgment was made (Directionality). I 
expected that the ability of IPTs to account for social judgment (the IPT X Target  
Level interaction) would be strongest when there was matching directionality. This 
should produce an IPT X Target Level X Directionality interaction.  
  I tested a random-slope, random-intercept multi-level model that predicted trait 
judgments from implicit personality theories, which were nested in trait pairs. I 
included two additional Level 1 variables: Target Level (-1 = target has the opposite of 
a trait, +1 = target has a trait) and Directionality (-1 = mismatching IPT/Target 
judgment directionality, +1 = matching IPT/Target judgment directionality). The three 
predictor variables were fully crossed to test for interaction effects.  
  Demonstrating that people did lean on their implicit personality theories in 
judging social targets, the IPT X Target Level interaction was significant, t(19.07) = 
7.55, p < .001. But as predicted, this predictive power depended on the matching 
directionality, t(4149.23) = 2.39, p = .02.  
  To understand the nature of this interaction, I compared the effect of implicit 
personality theories on social judgments for matching and mismatching directionality 
for targets that were said to either have or have the opposite of a particular trait. When 
the implicit personality theory and the target judgment were of matching 
directionality, there was a positive effect of IPTs on social judgment when the target 
was said to have a trait, t = 7.58, p < .001, and a negative effect of IPTs on social 
judgment when target was said to have the opposite of a trait, t = -3.62, p = .001. 
When the directionality was mismatched, there was a smaller effect of IPTs on social 
judgment when the target had a trait, t = 6.68, p < .001, and a non-significant effect   22 
when the target had the opposite of a trait, t = -1.78, p = .09. The unstandardized betas 
from the Hierarchical Linear Model are depicted in Figure 1.  
  To determine whether implicit personality theories more generally show 
evidence of directionality, or whether the observed effects may have been driven by 
the handful of trait pairs that showed group-level directionality effects, I conducted a 
follow-up analysis to my test of whether directional IPTs better predict social  
 
 
Figure 1: The impact of implicit personality theories on target judgment as a function 
of target type and congruence in the directionality of the target judgment and 
corresponding implicit personality theory . Pattern projection is reflected by positive 
betas for targets that have a trait, and negative betas for targets that do not have (have 
the opposite of) a trait. (Study 1).   23 
judgments than do IPTs of the reverse (mismatched) directionality. I divided the 
twenty relevant trait pairs into two equally-sized groups—those for which there was a 
larger average difference between the two possible IPTs (i.e., p (A | B) and p (B | A)), 
and those for which the  two IPTs were nearly equivalent. I then tested the same 
mixed-level model, but tested whether the influence of directionality was greater for  
those trait pairs that showed group-level mean differences. This 4-way interaction was 
non-significant, t < 1. This increases our confidence that IPTs, more generally, possess 
directionality. That is, even though many IPTs and their converse elicited similar 
judgments aggregated across people, the two judgments had distinct predictive power 
at the level of the individual. 
Discussion 
  Study 1 establishes in two ways that IPTs are indeed directional theories and 
are not merely assumed correlations. Across 55 measured IPTs, the reported theory 
depended on the direction in which the theory was assessed. As one example, 
participants who considered people who were more resigned than average thought 
there was a 65% chance that they would also be more skeptical than average. But 
when participants considered people who were more skeptical than average, they 
thought there was only a 47% chance that they would be more resigned than average. 
Logically, these two beliefs are not compatible, but they do reflect the directionality of 
theories that underlie people’s social judgments. It is easy to imagine why a person 
who is resigned may have grown skeptical about the world, but there is a less clear 
theory of why skeptical people have grown resigned (versus further emboldened). 
Furthermore, the directionality of theories mattered in predicting social judgments.  
  These findings support one condition that is necessary for my explanation of 
pattern projection, and confirm a prediction made by Sedikides and Anderson (1994) 
more than 15 years ago: “For some person types, causal connections between traits are   24 
likely to be directional” (p. 301). Sedikides and Anderson were referring to theories 
that may hold together certain person types or clusters of related traits. I have 
established that people hold directional theories more generally: to understand the way 
that personality traits in general are interconnected. I have proposed that in projecting 
patterns, people are not projecting correlations, Instead, they are projecting causal 
theories. One feature of causal theories is that they have directionality; correlations do 
not. According to my account, people will generate theories to explain a single person 
(typically, the self). These egocentric theories are then exported to explain people in 
general. Study 1 merely establishes that IPTs reflect directional theories. Our 
subsequent studies examine directly whether people do indeed construct causal trait 
theories to explain individuals, and whether such theories underlie IPTs and thus 
explain pattern projection. 
Study 2 
  When people are egocentrically pattern projecting, are they merely projecting 
the patterns they see in themselves onto other people? Or instead, are they actually 
projecting the theories they have developed to describe themselves? Study 1 found 
that implicit personality theories take the form of directional theories and are not 
merely “directionless” correlations that describe an association between two traits. In 
other words, people do not simply have a theory that trait A correlates with trait B; 
they have a theory of how much trait A leads to trait B, which may be distinct from 
how much trait B leads to trait A. If such theories are rooted in theories to explain the 
self, this may reflect the crucial bridge between person representations and implicit 
personality theories that account for pattern projection.  
  In Study 2, I test whether egocentric pattern projection emerges when people 
develop directional theories to explain the self. This explicit theory may then be 
projected onto people in general. For example, Christine may decide that her own   25 
idealism about the world is what is driving her conscientiousness. Even though 
Christine created this explanation to explain herself, the relationship it implies may be 
exported to explain people in general. In this way, egocentric pattern projection may 
emerge from the causal trait narratives people spin to explain the self. 
  According to this account, it is not enough for two traits to be connected in 
one’s causal trait narratives of the self. For example, people may explain the co-
occurrence of two traits in the self not by appealing to a causal theory (A causes B), 
but to a third variable theory (A and B share a directionless association because both 
stem from C). For example, perhaps Sarah sees her own dishonesty and 
conscientiousness as caused by the same underlying aspect of her personality—her 
desire to be president of the United States. But given work showing that causal 
theories (A   B) underlie assumed correlations (Ahn et al., 2002), one wouldn’t 
necessarily (but could in theory) expect a theory in one’s causal trait narrative that C 
causes both A and B (a third-variable theory) to lead to a more general assumed 
correlation between A and B (pattern projection). Also, given that A and B’s co-
occurrence is premised on something else about a person (the presence of C), it is not 
clear that a general A-B correlation would be projected. 
  In this study, I asked participants to state whether they had theories to explain 
why their traits related as they did. For some participants, they answered whether as 
part of their causal trait self-narrative, they had a causal theory for why how much 
they had one trait may be causing how much they had a second trait (causal theory). 
For other participants, they answered whether as part of their self-narratives, they had 
a theory that a single underlying aspect of their personality (e.g., another trait, a goal) 
gave rise to or caused how much they had each of the two traits (third-variable 
theory). I had two central predictions. First, if generating causal self-narratives gives 
rise to pattern projection, then I should find that for any given trait pair, those   26 
participants who have a causal explanation for why those traits are connected in the 
self should be those who are pattern projecting that theory onto others. Second, I 
expected that this would be especially (or perhaps only) true when participants had a 
theory for why one trait was causing the other trait (causal theory). Given that Study 1 
showed that the directionality of the theory is important, I always assessed IPTs and 
causal trait theories in the same direction. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Three hundred forty-five undergraduates at Cornell University participated in 
exchange for extra course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
theory type conditions: causal or third-variable theories. The order in which 
participants indicated their implicit personality theories and the extent to which they 
thought they had each of eleven traits was counterbalanced. Participants always 
completed questions about their causal trait narratives last. 
Self Judgments 
  Participants rated themselves on the same eleven personality traits used in 
Study 1: bashful, considerate, dependent, happy-go-lucky, idealistic, persistent, 
prideful, reserved, resigned, skeptical, wordy. For each trait, participants expressed 
how much that trait characterized their own personality on an eleven-point scale 
anchored at 1 (not at all) and 11 (extremely). As in Critcher and Dunning (2009a), I 
calculated absolute value difference scores (i.e., | traitx - traity|) for each of the 55 trait 
pairs as a measure of how “correlated” each trait pair was in the self. A lower absolute 
value difference score indicates the traits occur similarly in the self, and a higher 
absolute value difference reflects that the traits occur in opposition in the self. Pattern 
projection emerges when such participants assume the traits are similarly correlated in 
the population-at-large.   27 
Implicit Personality Theories 
  I again used single items, of the form, “If you knew that someone was more 
[trait X] than the average person, how likely would it be that the person was also 
[more Y] than the average person?” Again, I made explicit that “50% of people are 
above-average on any trait.” Unlike in Study 1, I also noted that if knowing someone’s 
standing on one trait provided no information about the person’s likely standing on a 
second trait, then the answer to the above question would be 50%. 
Causal Trait Narratives 
  Instructions explained to participants the notion of causal trait narratives. 
Participants were told that they would provide information about the content of their 
own causal trait narratives. For each of fifty-five trait pairs, I assessed whether the 
causal trait narratives participants had of themselves included a theory that explained 
why two traits related the way that they did in the self. Participants answered a 
dichotomous-response (yes / no) questions for each trait pair. Depending on 
participants’ theory type condition, these questions were in one of two forms: 
  Causal Theories. Those in the causal theory condition were asked whether in 
their self-narrative, they had a causal theory explaining why how much they had one 
trait was causing how much they had a second trait. For example, one item read, 
“Does how CONSIDERATE you are cause how WORDY you are?” Participants were 
instructed to press ‘Y’ if “Yes, I can think of a reason why there would be a causal 
relationship in that direction.” Participants pressed ‘N’ if they could not think of such 
a reason.  
  Third-variable Theories. Those in the third-variable theory condition were 
asked whether in their causal trait narrative, they had a theory explaining why another 
underlying aspect of their personality (e.g., another trait, a goal) was influencing how 
much they had two traits. For example, one of the items read, “Does a single   28 
underlying aspect (for example, a goal you have or another trait you possess) of your 
personality help explain how much you are CONSIDERATE and how much you are 
WORDY?” Participants pressed ‘Y’ to indicate that “Yes, I can think of an underlying 
aspect that would help explain why the two traits exist the way they do.” Otherwise 
participants were to press ‘N.’ 
Results 
  I used hierarchical linear modeling in order to assess whether pattern 
projection emerged more strongly for trait pairs that were causally linked in 
participants’ own causal trait narratives. Critcher and Dunning (2009a) demonstrated 
that pattern projection emerges when the participant is the unit of analysis or when the 
trait pair is the unit of analysis. That is, variation in how different trait pairs are 
patterned within a person predicts variation in that person’s corresponding implicit 
personality theories. Also, variation across people in how a specific pair of traits are 
patterned in their personalities predicts variation between people in their IPTs for that 
trait pair.  The present analyses capitalize on the strengths of the within-subjects and 
within-trait-pairs analyses simultaneously. The trait difference scores were nested 
within the trait pair, meaning that pattern projection was defined at the level of the 
trait pair. But I also standardized (i.e., z-scored), at the level of the individual 
participant, each input into our model.  
  The primary impetus for this (potentially conservative) standardization was 
that there was great variability between participants in how many trait pairs they 
indicated were in their own causal trait narratives. Standardization eliminates this 
source of variation. Such variance in participant responses could be driven by two 
sources. For one, it could reflect real differences between participants in how much 
they tended to construct theories to explain the self (a meaningful source of variation). 
Instead, it could reflect differences between participants in the subjective threshold   29 
they used in responding to the theory measures (e.g., “I’ll say YES as long as I feel 
like there is a reason even though I cannot completely articulate it” vs. “I’ll say YES 
only if I have spelled out in my mind a good argument that would convince the 
experimenter”) or other artifactual sources of variation. The former source of variance, 
according to our predictions, should produce real differences between people in how 
much they are pattern projecting. By controlling for person-level variance, I 
conservatively eliminate this source of variance that could be legitimately contributing 
to our effect. The latter (artifactual) source of variance merely adds noise that hampers 
our ability to detect a real effect. To the extent that the clarity gained by eliminating 
this noise is greater than the true “signal variance” lost, this data analytic strategy is 
useful. 
  First, to test whether there was indeed evidence of pattern projection, I tested 
whether the trait difference scores (nested within trait pairs) predicted variation in 
implicit personality theories. Replicating Critcher and Dunning (2009a), pattern 
projection emerged, B = 1.62, t(50.89) = 7.72, p < .001
2. In subsequent analyses, I will 
refer to the impact of the trait difference scores variable as pattern projection. 
  Second, I wanted to test whether the tendency for a participant to pattern 
project on a given trait pair depended on whether the participant had a causal theory in 
their causal trait self-narratives of why one trait caused the other. I extended on our 
model by adding in two additional Level 1 variables: a dichotomous theory present 
variable (z-scored at the level of the individual) indicating whether participants 
indicated they had a theory for that specific trait pair, and a pattern projection X theory 
present interaction term. As expected, the tendency to pattern project any given trait 
pair depended on whether participants reported having a theory explaining the co-
                                                 
2 Pattern projection is actually reflected by negative betas, but for ease of 
interpretation, all such betas , in this and all studies, have been reversed so that 
positive values reflect pattern projection   30 
occurrence of the traits in the self, B = 0.56, t(15,347.14) = 3.93, p < .001. Because I 
standardized the theory present variable at the level of the participant, there is not a 
straightforward way to test for the degree of pattern projection observed for trait pairs 
for which a theory exists compared to those for which no theory exists. For illustrative 
purposes, I present analyses from a similar model that did not perform that 
standardization. From that model, I find that there is  much greater pattern projection 
from those trait pairs for which there is a self-theory, B = 2.19,  t(111.22) = 8.71, p < 
.001, compared to those trait pairs for which there is not a self-theory, B = .92, 
t(103.05) = 3.73, p < .001. 
  Third, I did not predict that just any causal theory linking two traits in one’s 
self-narrative would be sufficient to produce pattern projection. Although causal 
theories developed to explain a specific instance can be easily generalized to become 
the foundation of a more general perceived correlation (Ahn et al., 2002), I did not 
necessarily expect to see a similar pattern for third-variable theories. I thus extended 
the model further by adding a new Level-1 predictor, a between-condition variable 
theory type (-1 = third-variable theory, +1 = causal theory). I also added the new 
interaction terms.  
  The predicted three-way interaction—pattern projection X theory presence X 
theory type—was significant, B = 0.44, t(17,021.64) = 3.12, p = .002. Figure 2 depicts 
this three-way interaction, showing the degree of pattern projection when a theory of 
each type (causal or third-variable) is present or absent.  I then conducted follow-up 
tests to understand how the impact of theories in one’s causal trait narrative on one’s 
IPTs differed depending on the nature of the theory. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
participants pattern projected a trait patterning more when the pair was bound by a 
causal theory in one’s causal trait narrative of the self, B = 0.88, t(18,619.25) = 6.20, p 
< .001. In contrast, when traits were merely linked by third-variable theories, there     31 
 
Figure 2. The degree of pattern projection for trait pairs that are or are not bound by 
causal theories or third-variable theories in causal trait narratives of the self. (Study 2) 
   
was no greater tendency to project those patternings, B = 0.17, t(18,614.27) = 1.20, p 
> .22. 
Discussion 
  I have suggested that pattern projection may emerge as a byproduct of coming 
to understand the self. That is, people will generate causal trait narratives that explain 
why one aspect of their personality causes another aspect of their personality (e.g., 
“My being considerate leads me to be so wordy: I am always trying to word 
everything in the kindest light possible, even if that causes me to be long-winded.”).  
Because people’s causal trait narratives do not include causal theories explaining   32 
every possible pairwise relationship between all of their traits, some trait pairs should 
be more likely sources for pattern projection than are others.   
  Confirming this hypothesis, Study 2 found that for any trait pair, those 
participants who pattern projected a trait patterning most strongly were those who had 
causally linked the two traits in their own causal trait narratives. But more specifically, 
it was not any type of theory that predicted increased pattern projection. Instead, 
causal self-theories (trait A causes trait B) predicted increased pattern projection, 
whereas third-variable self-theories (both trait A and trait B are caused by trait C) did 
not. If theories to explain the self are extended to explain people in general, it fits that 
theories that take the same form as implicit personality theories—directional causal 
theories (Study 1)—are those most likely to influence people’s IPTs. 
  Critcher and Dunning (2009a) highlighted that it is most important to measure 
pattern projection at the level of the trait pair. When pattern projection only emerges at 
the level of the individual, it is most likely that differences between trait pairs are 
responsible for artifactually producing pattern projection. It was particularly important 
for the present analyses that pattern projection emerged while implicit personality 
theories were nested within trait pair, for it helps to rule out an obvious alternative 
explanation for the present results. There were certain trait pairs that, across all 
participants, tended to be included in or excluded from people’s trait narratives. For 
example, 81% of participants had an explanation for why how reserved they were 
caused how bashful they were, whereas only 26% of participants had a theory why 
how dependent they were was causing how wordy they were. Had our measures been 
nested within participant (instead of trait pair), a plausible reverse-causality story 
could have artifactually produced our results. That is, it may be easier for everyone to 
explain why certain trait pairs are related (e.g., due to the semantic overlap of reserved 
and bashful), and these trait pairs co-occur similarly in everyone. These traits pairs   33 
would then be more likely to be in participants’ self-theories, and pattern projection 
would emerge more clearly for these pairs. This and similar alternative causal stories 
are made less plausible by the analytic approach employed. 
  If people automatically generalize the narratives they create to explain a 
specific person and use such narratives to explain people in general, this suggests a 
reason that pattern projection may be egocentric. People may tend to generate causal 
theories to explain the self more than they do for other people. This string of logic 
makes two predictions that the final three studies test. First, people should have more 
elaborate, accessible causal theories to explain why traits relate in the self than why 
traits relate in a well-known other (Studies 3 and 4). Second, pattern projection need 
not be egocentric. If one were to find an other about whom one had generated a causal 
narrative, then people may naturally pattern project from that person. Similarly, and 
more convincing in establishing causality, if people were prompted to generate a 
causal narrative to explain a social target, then people should begin to pattern project 
from that person (Study 5). Our account prioritizes the influence of the self only 
insofar as people’s causal trait narratives of themselves tend to be more elaborate and 
comprehensive than their causal narratives of others. 
Study 3 
  In Study 3, I asked participants to make a causal trait narrative map, either of 
themselves or their freshman year roommate. I chose freshman year roommates as a 
comparison target for two reasons. First, roommates have been used as a “familiar 
other” in prior research (Prentice, 1990), and thus could serve as a similar comparison 
target. Second, and more important, Critcher and Dunning (2009a) repeatedly 
established that college students pattern project from themselves but not from their 
freshman year roommates. Thus, if our account of pattern projection is true, people   34 
should have more causally elaborated conceptions of the self than of their freshman 
year roommates. 
  In Study 3, participants were given a set of note cards. On each was written a 
different personality trait. Participants were to create a visual representation of their 
causal trait narrative of themselves or of their freshman year roommate. Participants 
drew arrows to indicate causal relationships in their visual narratives. My primary 
prediction was that participants’ causal narratives of themselves would be more 
comprehensive and causally rich than their narratives of their roommates. Given that 
pattern projection is a particularly robust phenomenon and given Study 2’s finding 
that pattern projection arises from causal (but not third-variable) theories, I had a 
secondary prediction that narratives would be characterized much more by causal 
theories than by third-variable theories.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
  Two hundred eight undergraduates at Cornell University participated in 
exchange for $5 or extra course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to draw a 
visual map of their own causal narrative (self condition) or their narrative of their 
freshman year roommate (other condition).  
Procedure 
  All participants began by rating themselves or their freshman year roommates 
on sixteen personality traits: bashful, considerate, cunning, dependent, extravagant, 
generous, happy-go-lucky, idealistic, opportunistic, persistent, prideful, prudent, 
reserved, resigned, skeptical, wordy. I was not directly interested in the ratings 
themselves. Instead, I wanted all participants to have formulated a clear picture of 
their own and their roommate’s personality before reporting on their causal trait   35 
narratives. I did not want narrative differences to emerge only because trait knowledge 
about the self was more accessible.  
  In the next step, participants were given 16 index cards.  On each card was 
written one of the sixteen traits for which each participant had provided ratings for 
themselves or their roommates. At this point, participants were told that people 
sometimes construct narratives to explain people. The instructions explained that such 
narratives link together different aspects of one’s personality in a causal story. To 
facilitate thinking about causal trait narratives, participants were first asked to look 
through the cards and lump together cards that would cluster together as part of the 
same sub-narrative. That is, it was noted that as part of a causal trait narrative, people 
may have one or more subnarratives that explain why different clusters of traits relate 
as they do in a person.  As an example, it was noted that someone might lump together 
the cards (which no participant actually had) carefree, creative, and extroverted if they 
had a narrative causally combining the three traits: 
“As an example, imagine that you are very creative, not at all extroverted, and 
not at all carefree.  You may see that this creativity is in large part caused by 
all of the time you have to devote to creative projects given your lack of 
extroversion.  Furthermore, a desire to achieve and be successful may lead you 
to continue to develop your creative abilities, and the seriousness with which 
you undertake this endeavor makes you not all that carefree.” 
Those in the roommate condition saw similar instructions, though they were written to 
describe one’s freshman year roommate. The instructions stressed that each narrative 
had to have at least two traits in it. It was stressed to participants that they need not use 
all the cards. Participants recorded which cards they placed in each cluster or sub-
narrative. Although there are several interesting, measurable features of these maps 
(e.g., how many traits are part of narratives, how many clusters or“sub-narratives”   36 
participants create), this step was largely a prelude to the next stage, in which I had 
people draw out more complete causal narrative maps. Nonetheless, given that prior  
research has found that the factor structure of self perceptions is more complex than 
the structure of social perceptions (Borkenau & Liebler, 1994), I expected that there 
would be more distinct clusters or sub-narratives for the self than for someone else.  
  Finally, participants were told that they would draw out their more complete 
causal trait narratives. Specifically, participants were told they should indicate the 
ways in which a specific personality trait influenced another trait, or how two traits 
were influenced by the same underlying aspect of personality. These of course reflect 
the two types of theories measured in Study 2—causal and third-variable theories, 
respectively. Two examples were offered to illustrate the difference between these 
types of theories. I illustrated a causal link with, “In me, the lack of extroversion leads 
to an increase in creativity.” Participants represented a directional causal link by 
drawing a directional arrow from one trait to another.   A third-variable link was 
reflected by, “My desire to grow up to be a successful artist leads me to further 
develop my creative abilities and to spend a lot of time on solitary activities that are 
not very extroverted.” Participants represented a third-variable link by connecting two 
traits with a line, and then drawing an arrow that pointed at the line (see Figure 3). It 
was stressed to participants that they should not feel bound by the sub-narratives they 
had created in the first portion. I counted the number of directional and third-variable 
causal links depicted.  
Results 
  By every metric, the trait narratives of the self were more comprehensive and 
causally rich than the trait narratives of the roommates. The descriptive statistics for 
these narratives appear in Table 2. When describing the self, people listed more 
clusters or sub-narratives than when describing an other, t(202) = 2.22, p = .03.      37 
Figure 3. Example causal trait narrative. This narrative expresses 5 causal theories and 
2 third-variable theories. Note that two traits can be bound by both types of theory 
(e.g., Traits 1 and 7). 
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Furthermore, these sub-narratives describing the self were more comprehensive: They 
included more of the 16 traits than those describing someone else, t(182.26) = 2.81, p 
= .01).  Given Study 2 linked the presence of causal theories to pattern projection, it 
would be especially informative if people have more causal theories in the trait 
narratives of the self than in their narratives of others. And indeed, participants saw 
more causal relationships in the self than they did in someone, t(206) = 2.17, p = .03. 
Even though Study 2 suggested third-variable theories are not related to pattern 
projection, such theories were more numerous in narratives about the self than in 
narratives about someone else, t(195.17) = 2.38, p = .02. Given there is evidence that 
causal but not third-variable theories underlie pattern projection, it is notable that 
causal theories were much more numerous in the narratives of both the self, t(105) = 
20.39, p < .001, and of the other, t(101) = 22.32, p < .001.  
Discussion 
  As a first step in explaining the egocentric nature of pattern projection, I tested 
whether people do indeed have richer causal narratives for the self than for someone 
else. And indeed, narratives about the self were more comprehensive and more  
causally thorough. I imagine that these results provide an extremely conservative 
estimate of the differences in people’s narratives of themselves versus other people. 
Even if participants did not already have well-formed narratives about their freshman 
year roommates, the demands of the experimental task likely led them to try and create 
one. It is thus notable that differences emerged nonetheless.  
  Even though Study 2 found that causal theories, and not third-variable theories, 
were a plausible prerequisite for pattern projection to emerge, it is helpful that both 
types of theorizing were assessed. That is, it was particularly informative not only that 
the causal maps of the self were more comprehensive and causally rich, but that they 
were composed primarily of causal and not third-variable theories. Given that self-  39 
narratives are dominated by the types of theories that seemingly produce pattern 
projection, it may not be surprising that pattern projection is a robust phenomenon. 
  The question remains of whether participants drew concept maps that reflected 
pre-existing representations, or whether those causal maps were created in the 
moment. Study 4 tried to address this question of whether causal trait narratives of the 
self are not only more numerous but more likely to be preexisting (and therefore 
accessible) by including reaction time measures.  
Study 4 
  Much like in the causal theory condition in Study 2, participants in Study 4 
were asked fifty-five yes/no questions about whether two traits were linked causally in 
their causal trait narratives of themselves. Unlike in Study 2, they also answered the 
same questions concerning their causal trait narratives of their freshman year 
roommate. Also unlike in Study 2, I recorded how long it took participants to respond 
to each question. To the extent that a representation is already well-formed, people 
should be faster to indicate the presence or absence of information in that 
representation (Park, 1986; Prentice, 1990). I had two central predictions. First, I 
expected that even with this more structured and constrained measurement technique, 
I would once again find that people report more causal theories to explain the self than 
to explain someone else. Second, I expected that these causal narratives for the self 
would be more accessible than the narratives for the roommate. In other words, people 
should be faster to indicate whether they have a theory to explain the self than a theory 
to explain the roommate. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
  Participants were 41 undergraduates from Cornell University. In exchange for 
their participation, participants received $5 or course credit. Participants answered   40 
questions about the content of the causal trait narratives of themselves and of their 
freshman year roommates. 
Procedure 
  Participants began by rating themselves and their freshman year roommates on 
the same eleven personality traits used in Study 2. These were completed in a 
counterbalanced order. These ratings were completed for a similar reason that they 
were in Study 3: to give participants a chance to settle on their self- and roommate-
trait ascriptions before I assessed whether participants had accessible causal trait 
narratives for each target. I did not want the baseline accessibility of trait knowledge 
about the self to be able to account for differences in the accessibility of causal trait 
narratives. 
  Next, participants answered 55 questions about their self-narratives and 55 
questions about their causal trait narratives of their freshman year roommates. The 
concept of causal trait narratives was explained in the same way as in Study 2. To 
assess the presence of particular theories in participants’ causal trait narratives, 
participants answered questions of the form, “Does how SKEPTICAL you are [your 
roommate is] cause how PRIDEFUL you are [your roommate is]?” Responses were 
coded dichotomously (yes = 1; no = 0). Unlike in Study 2, participants were told that 
they would answer these causal theory questions about both themselves and their 
freshman year roommate. The order in which these were completed was 
counterbalanced across participants. Also, the computer recorded not only 
participants’ responses, but also how long it took them to make each dichotomous 
response.  
Results 
  I first tested whether participants’ own causal trait narratives were more 
causally comprehensive than their narratives of their roommates. I submitted the total   41 
number of “yes” responses to a mixed-model ANOVA, with the counterbalancing 
order variable as a between-subjects factor and target (self or other) as a within-
subjects factor. As predicted, participants’ self-narratives were more comprehensive 
(M = 28.26, SE = 1.42) than their causal narratives about their roommates (M = 24.47, 
SE = 1.44), F(1, 39) = 13.93, p < .001.  Also, participants were faster to answer 
questions about themselves (M = 4.02s, SE = .24s) than about their freshman year 
roommates, (M = 4.36s, SE = .29s), F(1, 39) = 6.43, p = .02. This accessibility 
difference was equally strong regardless of whether participants were indicating that a 
particular trait pair was or was not in their causal narrative for their roommate or for 
themselves, F < 1.  
Discussion 
  These findings conceptually replicate and extend on those of Study 3. Not only 
do people possess more causally rich causal trait narratives to represent the self 
compared to someone else, but these theories are more accessible. It is notable that 
participants were faster to indicate both the presence and the absence of a theory for 
the self. This most likely indicates that participants had a more extensive pre-existing 
causal trait narrative of the self, which included (or permitted easy assessment of) both 
what was theorized about and that which was not. Furthermore, given that prior 
research has found that reaction times in this paradigm only differentiate knowledge 
that is core to a person representation as opposed to knowledge that is more peripheral 
(Park, 1986), the present findings indicate that such causal theories form a core part of 
people’s self-knowledge.  
  The accessibility findings are particularly important, because they help to rule 
out an alternative explanation for the results of Study 3. In Study 3, participants had 
little guidance or constraint as they drew their causal concept maps. The experimenter 
did not tell participants how long was a reasonable length of time to spend on the task.   42 
Although this open-ended technique has the benefit of assessing spontaneously 
produced representations of the self versus someone else (see also Chen, 2003), the 
unconstrained nature of the task leaves the results open to a criticism. Participants may 
have been more motivated to draw a more nuanced narrative of themselves, perhaps 
because they enjoyed indulging in such self-thought and self-analysis. Of course, to 
the extent that people in their daily lives enjoy self-analysis more than other-analysis, 
this would not reflect a threat to internal validity as much as it would reflect an origin 
of these representational differences. Regardless, this alternative cannot account for 
the findings of Study 4. Participants took less time to report on their own self-concept. 
If participants walked into the experiment with similar baseline representations of the 
self and of their roommates, but then were more willing to take the time to construct 
theories to explain the self than to explain the roommate, I would have seen that it 
took participants longer to answer the self questions than the roommate questions. 
Study 5 
  The present study was designed to tie together multiple strands in the present 
studies that have suggested that: a) the causal richness of the self-narrative explains 
why pattern projection emerges (Study 2), and b) that the special richness of the self-
narrative compared to a narrative of someone else (Study 3 and 4) may explain the 
egocentric nature of pattern projection (Critcher & Dunning, 2009a). If the causal 
richness of the self-narrative explains why pattern projection is typically egocentric, it 
follows that people will pattern project from another person (and thereby reduce the 
egocentric nature of the effect) once they have developed a causal narrative to explain 
the other person’s personality. This would more conclusively establish the mechanism 
behind pattern projection that was supported by correlational evidence in Study 2 and 
made plausible by the self-other differences observed in Studies 3 and 4.    43 
  In Study 5, I presented participants with trait information about three novel 
targets. Some participants constructed a causal narrative to explain why the traits 
related as they did in those targets. Other participants processed the information about 
these targets in a more piecemeal fashion that did not involve narrative building. 
Although past research has found that people have little trouble writing out 
descriptions of others’ personalities (e.g., Park et al., 1994), no prior work has 
requested that people generate causal trait narratives. Nonetheless, given that people 
have little trouble generating ad hoc theories on demand (McNorgan, Kotack, Meegan, 
& McRae, 2007), I expected that participants would be able to generate causal trait 
narratives to explain other people.  
  After processing the target information in one of the two ways, participants 
stated their implicit personality theories. I expected that participants who generated 
causal narratives to explain a specific other would begin to pattern project from that 
person. Of course, my account does not predict that it is enough to try to create a 
causal trait narrative about someone else, but that one should actually be successful in 
doing so before such non-egocentric pattern projection will emerge. This predicts a 
more nuanced hypothesis that only to the extent that a participant reports success in 
generating a causal narrative about the target will he or she pattern project from the 
target. At the end of the study, participants completed a surprise memory test for the 
targets they had seen. This allowed me to test whether any differences between the 
conditions in the degree of pattern projection could be explained by differences in 
memory for the targets. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
  Participants were 405 undergraduates at Cornell University who completed the 
experiment in exchange for extra course credit. Participants were randomly assigned   44 
to one of four conditions in a 2 (processing task: causal narrative or control) X 2 
(target version) full-factorial design. 
Targets 
  I chose twelve traits that I had used in prior studies. These traits were randomly 
grouped into three groups of four traits. The four traits in each group would form the 
basis for a description of a novel target. I then constructed two versions of each person 
by randomly determining, for each target, whether the target was described as “very 
much” having the trait, or “not at all (being the opposite of)” the trait. To minimize the 
likelihood that two contrasting traits would be nonsensically paired within the same 
person (e.g., very bashful but not at all reserved), I added the constraint that the four 
traits used to describe a person had to be fairly uncorrelated. (I used trait ratings from 
past studies to confirm that the absolute value of the correlations was less than .20.)  
  The two versions of the three targets are listed in Table 3. What is less 
important than the level of each trait in each target is how each pair of traits relates in 
each target. For example, even though Target 3’s skepticism and prudence differ by 
version, the two traits are “negatively correlated” in each version and thus do not 
constitute a trait pair of interest. Across the three targets, 11 of the 18 observed trait 
relationships differ between the two targets. If participants are pattern projecting from  
a target, then they should infer more of a positive correlation between two traits when 
the traits relate similarly in the target (“very much” – “very much” or “not at all” – 
“not at all”). They should infer more of a negative correlation when the traits exist 
dissimilarly in the target (“very much” – “not at all” or “not at all” – “very much”).  
Procedure 
  Participants were first informed that they would receive information about 
three different people. This information would comprise four sentences, each 
conveying trait-relevant information. As seen in Table 3, each sentence was of the    45 
form, “Person X is [very; very much NOT] trait Y.” After each sentence appeared on 
the screen, 45 seconds elapsed before the next sentence would appear. Even after the 
next sentence would appear, the prior sentences were still visible. During the 45-sec   46 
period, participants were to engage in one of two processing tasks, depending on their 
condition: 
  Causal Narrative. The instructions in the causal narrative condition prompted 
participants to generate a causal narrative explaining how the traits all influenced each 
other to give rise to a single, coherent individual. “Your task will be to incorporate 
each new piece of information you learn into a coherent picture of the person. You 
want to try and link together individual traits to understand how they influence or 
affect each other, why they fit together as they do in the same person. For example, 
after you learned that a target was ‘very much NOT extroverted’ but ‘very creative’, 
you might type that ‘Time to himself probably helps him enrich his creative inner-life. 
Also, since he probably isn’t that social that probably lets him devote time to artistic 
or whatever creative activities he is into,’” It was emphasized to participants that they 
should try to analyze and type for the full forty-five seconds. 
  Control. As a control task, it was important that participants still focus on 
information about the target, but I did not want them to generate causal theories about 
why the traits were configured in the targets in the manner stated. Accordingly, these 
participants were to elaborate on what it meant for the target to possess each of his or 
her traits. Thus, when each new sentence appeared, instead of spending 45 seconds 
trying to generate theories to connect the newly presented trait to the other traits, the 
participant spent 45 seconds elaborating on what the trait meant.  “For example, if you 
learned a person was ‘very much NOT extroverted,’ you might type that the person is 
‘a sociable, affable kind of person, interested in socializing, not at all aloof or shy, 
warm, gregarious...’” It was emphasized that participants were to generate these 
descriptions only about the most recently presented piece of information. This was 
stressed so participants would not think their task was to synthesize across the traits 
and describe what the person as a whole was like.   47 
Procedure 
  Participants were told that they were taking part in the second half of a two-
part experiment. In the first part, past participants had supposedly generated four traits 
that a person “very much was” or “very much was not (was the opposite of)”. In the 
present study, participants would see those descriptions. Depending on their condition, 
participants received one of the two sets of processing instructions described above. 
Then, participants were exposed to the three targets while either generating causal trait 
narratives to explain the targets, or by elaborating on what each of their traits meant. 
  After participants completed the full three-minute processing task for each 
target, participants were asked how difficult it was to successfully complete the 
processing task for that target by pressing 1 (not at all difficult), 2 (a little difficult), 3 
(somewhat difficult), or 4 (very difficult). I was primarily interested in this measure in 
the causal narrative condition, for it provided an indication of whether participants 
were able to generate a causal narrative with no difficulty, or whether they found it 
very, or perhaps too difficult. 
  After participants had been exposed to all three targets, participants stated their 
implicit personality theories for all eighteen possible trait pairs, even though only 
eleven of these trait pairs would allow us to assess whether participants were pattern 
projecting from the targets. I measured implicit personality theories using Critcher and 
Dunning’s (2009a) three-judgment method—assessing p(trait 1), p(trait 2), and p(trait 
1 | trait 2). The IPT was derived from the following linear expression: p(trait 1 | trait 2) 
* p(trait 2) – p(trait 1) * p(trait 2). 
  At the end of the experiment, participants encountered a surprise recognition 
task. Participants were presented with the twelve traits that had been associated with 
the three targets. They had to indicate whether the target in question “very much” or 
“very much did NOT” have the trait. In this way, I could assess whether any tendency   48 
to pattern project differently by condition could actually be attributable to a superior 
explicit memory for the information about the target. 
  All participants had indicated their own standing on each of the traits on a 
web-based pretest, completed at least 24 hours before coming to the lab. These ratings 
were made on eleven-point scales anchored at 1(not at all me) and 11 (completely me).  
Results 
  First, I wanted to test whether those assigned to generate a causal trait narrative 
of someone else would begin to pattern project from that person. Recall that there 
were eleven key trait pairs that differentiated the two targets. Therefore, I was 
interested in whether generating a causal narrative to explain a target would change 
participants’ implicit personality theories for those key 11 trait pairs. More 
specifically, I expected that those who wrote a causal narrative to explain the person 
would state implicit personality theories that recapitulated the intertrait patterns that 
resided in the targets.  
  To test for this pattern, I first created a new variable called Patterning. This 
dichotomous variable was used to differentiate those trait pairs that implied the same 
direction of correlation (positive or negative) within a version. That is, I chose one of 
the versions, coded each trait pair implying a positive correlation as +1, and each trait 
pair implying a negative correlation as -1. These codings were used to describe both 
versions. In this way, the Patterning X Version interaction tests whether participants 
are pattern projecting from the targets. In describing results, I will refer to the 
Patterning X Version interaction as “Pattern Projection.” In this way, the Patterning X 
Version X Processing Task interaction tests whether the degree of pattern projection 
from the target depends on the processing condition. Given that the past studies have 
indicated that variability in the way traits relate in the self accounts for variability in 
people’s implicit personality theories, I used participants’ pretest ratings of themselves   49 
to create absolute value difference scores for all relevant trait pairs (i.e., | Self rating 
on trait i  – Self rating on trait j|). These self-ratings were included as a covariate in all 
analyses. 
  A multi-level model was constructed to assess these hypotheses. Patterning 
was nested within the subject. There were four additional predictors: Version, 
Processing Task, Difficulty, and Self-ratings. All higher-order interaction terms were 
included in the full model. Replicating the standard pattern projection effect, I found a 
significant effect of Self-ratings, indicating that there was significant pattern 
projection from the self, B = .08, t(4,278.00) = 5.38, p < .001. But also, for the first 
time, I found that participants pattern projected from the targets as well, B = .05, 
t(396.83) = 3.25, p = .001.  Of course, I did not expect that all participants would 
pattern project from the targets, and as predicted, people pattern projected from a 
target more once they generated a causal trait narrative of the target, B = .03 t(396.83) 
= 1.95, p = .05. Confirming the central prediction, participants who wrote causal trait 
narratives of the targets began to pattern project from them, B = .08, t(400.51) = 3.61, 
p < .001. But those who merely processed information about the target in a piecemeal 
fashion showed no hint of pattern projection from the target, B = .02, t < 1. 
  Of course, I am not predicting that merely trying to generate a causal trait 
narrative will produce pattern projection. Instead, participants would need to be 
reasonably successful in doing so. Thus, a Patterning X Version X Processing Task X 
Difficulty
3 interaction would provide more detailed support for our proposed 
mechanism by testing whether only those who successfully generated causal narratives 
about a target were those who were pattern projecting from the targets. And indeed, 
                                                 
3 People found it marginally more difficult to complete the control task (M = 2.70, SE 
= .037) than the causal narrative task (M = 2.60, SE = .036), F(1, 399) = 3.23, p = .07. 
As such, I standardized the difficulty ratings separately by processing task condition 
before running the model.    50 
this qualification by difficulty was also significant, B = .05, t(1,792.36) = 3.18, p = 
.001. I completed additional analyses to further understand the Pattern Projection X 
Processing Task X Difficulty interaction. I ran four additional versions of the model to 
assess the level of pattern projection for those who had an easy or a difficult time with 
each of the two processing tasks. The degree of pattern projection from the target for 
each difficulty / processing task combination is depicted in Figure 4. When 
participants completed the control processing task (and merely elaborated on what 
each trait of the target’s in isolation), they did not pattern project, regardless of 
whether participants found this elaboration task difficult, F < 1, or simple, F (1, 5507) 
= 1.12, p > .28. This conceptually replicates Critcher and Dunning’s (2009a) 
consistent failure to find pattern projection from an other. But for those who generated 
causal narratives about the target, they pattern projected from the target when they 
found it relatively easy to generate this narrative, F(1, 5507) = 24.23, p < .001, but not 
when they found it difficult to do, F < 1. No interaction terms with the self-ratings 
approached significance. 
  These findings still leave open the question of whether writing a causal trait 
narrative about a person influenced the way people thought about people in general 
(i.e., their implicit personality theories) for an artifactual reason—enhanced memory 
for details of the target. Past research has found that people have enhanced memory 
for information about people when they are trying to form an impression of them than 
when they are merely trying to memorize the information about them (Hamilton, Katz, 
& Leirer, 1980). And indeed, participants in the causal narrative conditions did have a 
better memory for the targets’ standing on the 12 traits (M = 10.19, SD = 2.06) than 
those in the control condition (M = 9.20, SD = 2.40), t(386.53) = 4.46, p < .001. But 
there was no evidence that superior memory for the trait information was the mediator 
responsible for the impact of causal trait narrative generation on pattern projection.    51 
 
Figure 4. Pattern projection from the novel social targets as a function of processing 
task condition and the difficulty participants had with the processing task. High and 
Low difficulty is predicted at  + 1 standard deviation from the mean level of self-
reported difficulty in the relevant processing task condition (Study 5). 
 
When memory was added to the model, it was not the case that accurately recalling 
the way that traits were positioned in a target increased the chance that participants 
would pattern project from that target, B = -.02, t(2,772.94) = 1.30, p > .19. 
Discussion    
  Study 5 makes two central contributions. First, it demonstrates that generating 
a causal narrative about someone causes one to pattern project from that person. In   52 
this sense, the story we tell about a person, not merely the self, becomes a story about 
human nature. Study 2 hinted at this causal connection by showing that individual 
differences in the presence of these self-narratives predicted the degree of pattern 
projection from the self. In the present study, I manipulated whether people generated 
causal, explanatory narratives, and this led people to pattern project from the person 
about whom those narratives were generated. 
  Second, the study finds a theoretically predicted limit to the egocentric nature 
of pattern projection. Studies 3 and 4 began to answer the question of why pattern 
projection is egocentric—people had more comprehensive and more accessible 
narratives about themselves than they did about someone else. Even though people 
may tend to have fewer narratives about other people, the present study shows that 
when participants were led to construct a narrative about someone else, they began to 
pattern project from that person. In this way, by decomposing the origin of pattern 
projection into processes that could characterize people’s thinking about anyone, we 
begin to see the circumstances in which pattern projection will emerge from others as 
well. Note this clarifies that there is a natural limit to the egocentric nature of pattern 
projection. When people generate causal trait narratives about others, pattern 
projection should occur not only from the self but from these others as well. Future 
research could ask who is likely to generate causal narratives about what kinds of 
people and in what circumstances. In answering this, researchers would have a better 
idea of what social targets besides the self tend to inform people’s basic beliefs about 
human nature.    
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Chapter 3: General Discussion 
  Critcher and Dunning (2009a) provided evidence of pattern projection—a 
qualitatively novel way in which the self influences social judgment—but conceded 
that it was unclear exactly why pattern projection occurs. The present studies 
answered the question left open by past research, and in so doing demonstrated 
heretofore unidentified representational bases of implicit personality theories and of 
the self . First, I found that implicit personality theories reflect directional theories; 
they do not simply reflect assumed correlations (Study 1). This suggests that when 
people pattern project, they are not projecting a correlation from a sample of one onto 
people in general. Instead, they are projecting a causal theory that explains a sample of 
one, thereby applying that theory to explain people in general. Consistent with this, 
and second, I found that when people have an explicit theory to explain why two traits 
co-occur in the self (i.e., a causal trait narrative), they are then more likely to project 
that patterning onto people in general (Study 2). That is, the narrative used to explain 
the self becomes the narrative used to explain people in general. These two findings 
suggest an answer to why pattern projection is egocentric: People have more 
elaborated (Studies 3 and 4) and more accessible (Study 4) causal trait narratives to 
explain the self than to explain a familiar other. But once people are prompted to 
generate a narrative to explain someone else, they begin to pattern project from this 
person as well (Study 5). Thus, although pattern projection may tend to be an 
egocentric phenomenon, people will begin to pattern project from an other once they 
have developed a causal trait narrative to understand this other person. In this way, 
coming to understand a person—whether that be the self or someone else—changes 
the way one thinks about people in general.    
Why are causal trait narratives more elaborated for the self than for others?   54 
  Critcher and Dunning (2009a) demonstrated egocentric pattern projection, but 
did not demonstrate why pattern projection emerged or why it was egocentric. The 
current research answers these questions, but similarly raises new ones. The present 
results show that pattern projection emerges as a byproduct of generating causal trait 
narratives to explain the structure of someone’s personality, and accounts for the 
egocentric nature of pattern projection by showing that such causal trait narration is 
egocentric. But it does not answer why people generate more elaborate trait narratives 
for the self than for other people. One intuitively appealing answer, but one that I find 
ultimately incomplete, is that the self is the object of its own thoughts more than are 
other people. In all of that egocentric thought, there would simply be more of a chance 
for people to elaborate causal narratives to understand the self. Although there is no 
doubt some truth in this statement, it seems unlikely to offer a complete explanation 
given that Critcher and Dunning (2009a) consistently found that people displayed no 
hint of pattern projection from their freshman year roommates. It seems that over the 
course of a year of living in the same room as someone else, people certainly would 
have spent considerable time thinking about that familiar other. Thus, even if pattern 
projection were egocentric—driven more by self-views than views of others—one 
might still expect a (reduced) effect of people’s roommates on their implicit 
personality theories. 
  A second possibility is that people may be more motivated to construct self-
narratives, because such narratives may have a perceived functional benefit of 
assisting in producing long-term personality change. Given that traits are assumed to 
be fairly stable labels of personality, causal trait narratives may be of little use in 
predicting immediate behaviors, suggesting they may not be very useful in forecasting 
the short-term behavior of other people. In other words, in the short run, causal trait 
narratives may provide little additional predictive power above and beyond the trait   55 
labels themselves.  But if people wish to change unpleasant aspects of their own 
personality, a causal trait narrative would help to focus people on the deeper causes of 
their own imperfections. This logic would explain why people would construct 
narratives to explain negative aspects of one’s personality, but given that both the 
present research and Critcher and Dunning (2009) examined pattern projection from 
relatively neutral traits (Anderson, 1968), this idea cannot account for the documented 
examples of pattern projection. 
  A third possibility, and one that I favor, stems from research showing that trait-
based understanding of the self is more nuanced than it is of others (Sander, Goethals, 
& Radloff, 1988). This nuance stems from people realizing that people do not always 
behave consistently with their traits, but display some variety across situations (Baxter 
& Goldberg, 1987). For example, even a person who considers himself extroverted 
can think of certain contexts in which he is more reserved. And when social 
expectations or desires are violated, people spontaneously engage in causal narrative 
building to construct a story to make sense of the discrepancy (Kunda, Miller, & 
Claire, 1990; Risen, Gilovich, & Dunning, 2007). For example, Charlie and his friends 
may all consider Charlie to be conscientious. But what Charlie realizes, but few other 
people know, is that although Charlie is extremely conscientious at work, he is 
disorganized with his finances. Thus, even though Charlie may consider himself a 
conscientious person, the exceptions to this label may prompt Charlie to narrate that it 
is his career aspiration that drive his conscientiousness. Thus, people may make sense 
of the imperfectness of their own trait labels by appealing to causal trait narratives (see 
Chen, 2003). 
  If this explanation is true, it provides insight into when we would expect that 
people would generate causal narratives to explain other people. Prentice (1990) 
described that with increasing familiarity about other people, one is likely to encounter   56 
more and more inconsistent information about the person. She speculated that person 
understanding may then include explanations or theories that bring coherence to a 
diverse set of information. Given that this notion of Prentice’s is compatible with our 
conception of causal trait narratives, it may be that we have causal trait narratives for 
individuals with whom we have sufficient familiarity that we are aware of behavioral 
exceptions to their traits.  
  But note that while knowledge of others’ inconsistencies may prompt some 
causal theorizing about other people, it is unlikely to be as comprehensive as the 
causal theorizing we generate to understand ourselves. Given that we observe 
ourselves in a wider variety of contexts than we observe anyone else, we are more 
likely to know our own inconsistencies. People may believe they know everything 
about their spouses or their children, but these others may be very different people 
while at school or work. Also, any narrative we develop to explain someone else may 
provide more of a sense of explanatory completeness than a similar narrative about the 
self would, limiting the likely scope of our narratives of others. We look inward and 
see complex selves, with much hidden beneath the surface, whereas we see any 
information we receive about others as providing a more complete picture of their 
personalities (Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross, 2001). For example, Kunda et al. 
(1990) found that when participants learned of a gay construction worker, they 
developed the causal narrative that the man’s homosexuality prompted him to 
compensate by seeking out a traditionally masculine career. I suspect that those 
participants saw such a narrative as a fairly complete description of the person, 
whereas I suspect that the construction worker would find such a description of 
himself as horribly incomplete. Because pattern projection is typically assessed across 
a large variety of randomly selected traits, pattern projection from a target would be 
detected only to the extent that the social perceiver has constructed comprehensive   57 
narratives to explain the target. Incomplete or simplistic narratives (e.g., “Everything 
about her stems from her being a jerk”) will not give rise to pattern projection. 
What makes it into a person’s causal trait narrative? 
  Given that people’s causal trait narratives will not be entirely comprehensive, 
one can ask what the nature of people’s own narratives is likely to be. In the present 
paper, I have focused on the existence of and a consequence of having causal trait 
narratives. Left unexamined is the pattern to the content of these narratives. Three 
questions naturally emerge. First, what trait pairs are included in causal trait 
narratives, and what pairs are not? Second, are there certain trait pairs that are 
particularly likely to be included in one’s causal trait narratives of the self (compared 
to narratives of other people)? Third, although Study 3 found that directional theories 
are more pervasive than third-variable theories, it remains unknown which traits are 
given causal priority in narratives, and which are most easily explained by other traits 
and goals.  
  To examine whether certain trait pairs are especially likely or unlikely to be 
included in causal trait narratives, I returned to Study 4 to conduct some exploratory 
analyses on the trait narratives of the self and of one’s freshman year roommate. Of 
course, some traits are highly correlated, and thus it may be obvious why they are 
related. For example, the semantic overlap of bashful and reserved lead the two traits 
to be highly correlated (r = .54 in Study 4), and a majority of people (73%) had a 
theory for why one trait was causing the other. So what is perhaps most interesting are 
trait pairs that are especially likely or unlikely to be included in trait narratives, even 
controlling for the degree to which they are correlated.  
  In order to identify such pairs, I calculated—for both the self judgments and 
the roommate judgments—the (absolute value) correlations between the two traits that 
formed each trait pair and the percentage of participants reporting that they had a   58 
causal theory to explain the way the traits related in the self as they did. Reflecting the 
way that causal theories underlie the understanding of perceived correlations (Ahn et 
al., 2002), the more correlated two traits were, the more likely participants were to 
have a causal theory connecting then (r = .55, for the self; r = .59, for the roommate). I 
then regressed the percentage of participants who claimed to have a theory for each 
trait pair on the correlation of each trait pair, separately for the self and for the 
roommate. The residuals reflect the degree to which trait pairs are “overincluded” or 
“underincluded” in narratives.  
  Given the pattern of the residuals was quite similar between the model 
predicting self narratives and that predicting roommate narratives ( r = .82), I summed 
across these residuals to get a clearer idea of which trait pairs are over- or 
underincluded in people’s causal trait narratives. Listed in Table 4 are the five most 
over-included and under-included trait pairs. Instead, one can subtract the residuals 
from the analyses on roommate narratives from the residuals for the same model about 
the self. This shows what trait pairs are especially unlikely or especially likely to 
appear in a self narrative (compared to a roommate narrative). Listed in Table 5 are 
the five most over-included and under-included trait pairs in self narratives (compared 
to roommate narratives).  
  I hesitate to draw firm conclusions on observed patterns, because the ability to 
detect narratives was of course constrained by the trait pairs I happened to measure. 
Nonetheless, there are some hints of patterns that I expect may be more general. For 
example, participants seemed to have a surprising number of theories in which 
skeptical was a causal antecedent and persistent was a consequent. Skepticism seems 
to be more of an internal trait, characterizing the way one processes information about 
the world. Persistence, in contrast, refers to the intensity of one’s behavioral 
responses. Thus, I expect that there may be a more general tendency to create causal   59 
narratives in which internal traits give rise to external traits. It is also notable that the 
two theories that are most overrepresented in self-narratives explain whether one is  
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wordy. Wordiness may be a trait for which people are particularly attentive to 
variation in the self, but less so to variation in the behavior of others. If self theorizing    61 
is especially comprehensive because we are especially attentive to inconsistencies in 
our own behavior, it makes sense that people would be especially likely to generate 
theories about themselves to explain their own level of wordiness. Future research 
should be designed to identify more specific patterns in people’s causal trait 
narratives.  
Why does social experience not eliminate egocentric implicit personality theories? 
  Given that people have substantial experience with others, why is it that such 
experience does not force them to realize that their own egocentric narratives may not 
be applicable to people in general? One possibility is that people do not carefully 
attend to others, or to all aspects of others, equally. Explanatory theories focus 
attention on compatible feature co-occurrences (Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989). Thus, 
egocentric causal trait narratives may direct attention toward others who are 
compatible with the narrative, and this selective attention may provide biased support 
for one’s own initial theories 
  Second, it takes more to directly contradict a projected pattern than a projected 
attribute. This is because it takes two pieces of disconfirming evidence to violate a 
pattern. For example, if David sees himself as liberal and warm, as soon as he learns 
that Thad maxed out on his contribution to John McCain’s election campaign, David 
will no longer see Thad as a liberal, and attributive projection is blocked. In contrast, 
David can continue to pattern project onto Thad if David decides that Thad must be a 
cold-hearted conservative. That is, by shifting his view of Thad on the second 
characteristic (warmth), there remains consonance between the pattern David observed 
in Thad (conservative and cold) and the pattern David observes in himself (liberal and 
warm). As such, even as people learn more about social targets, they can revise their 
impressions so that egocentric implicit personality theories are not violated. Consistent 
with this possibility, even as the academic year progressed, students living in a   62 
residence hall showed no increase in their consensus in judgments of each others’ 
personalities (Park & Kraus, 1993; cf. Funder, Kolar, & Blackman, 1995), and pattern 
projection onto such well-individuated targets remains strong (Critcher & Dunning, 
2009a). Thus, greater experience with other people does not communicate 
unambiguous information about those targets’ personality. 
  Third, even when people construct causal trait narratives of other people, these 
may not water down the egocentric nature of pattern projection because such social 
narratives may be egocentric themselves. Park et al. (1994) found that participants 
provided with the exact same information about a target developed very different 
narratives to understand the target. The authors reported that they could not find any 
individual difference variable that was able to predict what narrative participants used 
to organize their information about the novel targets. According to our research, 
people may have gravitated toward social narratives that were most consistent with 
their own self narratives. In this way, people may choose to structure their narratives 
about other people in a way that confirms the universality of patterns observed in the 
self. 
  Fourth, causal trait narratives may not only guide our attention to or 
understanding of other people, but the narratives themselves may serve to hold one’s 
self-views in place (see Critcher & Dunning, 2009b). Although past work has found 
that there is surprisingly low intertemporal consistency in people’s own life narratives 
(McAdams et al., 2006), the epistemic function of causal trait narratives likely makes 
them more stable. That is, although the perceived centrality of defining episodes in 
one’s own life may wax and wane, there is little reason to believe that people need to 
continually revise their explanations for why the different aspects of their personalities 
relate as they do. Such stability may hold people’s trait self-perceptions in place. That 
is, once people have developed a reason why their resigned attitude gives rise to their   63 
dependent interpersonal style, the theory may cement people’s self-perception. This 
means that self-views may become rigid and thus flawed, but such fixed self-views 
provide constant validation for one’s own theories.  
  Finally, people do not come to understand themselves in a vacuum. Self-
understanding is a social process. Life narratives are socially constructed (Adler & 
McAdams, 2007; Pasupathi, 2001), and causal trait narratives likely are as well. 
People likely try out their causal trait narratives on other people, who are known to 
provide an important validating function for the narratives people construct (Pasupathi 
& Rich, 2005). People may confuse others’ supportive reactions to causal trait 
narratives of the self for feedback that the narratives are the accurate theories of 
human behavior.  
Interpersonal Trait Narratives, Interpersonal Pattern Projection 
  Causal trait narratives need not refer only to intrapersonal trait dynamics. They 
could refer to interpersonal trait dynamics as well. People will include their 
conceptions of close others in the self (Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, Mashek, 
Lewandowski, Wright, & Aron, 2004; Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 2002), and members of 
collectivist cultures naturally have a more expansive view of the self (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Thus, people’s narratives may expand to include features of others 
as well. Such narratives may include explanations for why traits in the self relate to, 
influence, or are influenced by traits in close others.  
  Interpersonal trait narratives may then produce pattern projection at the dyadic 
level. For example, romantic couples may generate theories for why a trait in one 
partner has given rise to a trait in the second partner. The couple may then generalize 
these theories and use them as bases for expectations about new couples they meet. In 
this way, interpersonal pattern projection will look similar to standard pattern 
projection, except the two component traits reside in separate people instead of in the   64 
same person. But interpersonal pattern projection also permits projection of the same 
traits. For some traits, members of a dyad will display similarity, whereas on other 
traits they will evince complementarity. Couples may expect to see the patterns in 
their own dyad recapitulated in other couples. This may be especially true to the extent 
that the couples have created narratives to explain their own dyadic patterns. 
Conclusion  
   The present research has both advanced and bridged our understanding of the 
nature of implicit personality theories and self-conceptions. People’s beliefs as lay 
personality psychologists and their beliefs about themselves as people have at their 
core causal theories. Pattern projection is but one phenomenon that results from the 
construction of causal trait narratives to understand the dynamics of a person, 
especially the self. Future research will no doubt uncover additional consequences of 
this heretofore unidentified type of person representation.   
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